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I. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-3-102(4), and pursuant to the Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court dated 
November 17, 2009, transferring this matter to this Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Defendants/Appellees Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook assert 
that the principal issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
Standard for review: Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court "grant[s] no deference to the court below, but instead, 'the district court's 
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for 
correctness.'" Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, \ 8, 178 P.3d 930 (quoting Massey 
v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10,1 8, 152 P.3d 312). Additionally, in reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Arnold Indus, v. 
Love, 2002 UT 133, ^ 11, 63 P.3d 721 (quotingDCMInv. Corp. v. PinecrestInv. Co., 
2001UT91,P6,34P.3d785). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Ms. Hampton") 
filed her original complaint against Defendants on August 14, 2007 (R. 1). She 
eventually filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008 (R. 131), bringing 
claims against Defendants for declaratory judgment, (R. 138), breach of contract (R. 
140), breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. 141), slander of title (R. 142), 
negligence (R. 143), and fraud (R. 144). The factual allegations in Plaintiffs Third 
Amended Complaint pertain to transactions involving parcels of real property in Carbon 
County, Utah: one parcel of approximately 4,000 acres (R. 134), and one parcel of 
approximately 6.32 acres with a residence (R. 134). Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that she 
owned those parcels together with Kim Jensen (whom she refers to as K.C. Jensen or her 
"Joint Tenant"), but that her name was "fraudulently" removed from the title to the 
properties. (R. 133-138). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Professional Title Services 
and Clay Holbrook assisted Kim Jensen with the transactions wherein Plaintiff lost her 
interest in the properties. (R. 133-138). 
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she entered into an oral 
agreement with Clay Holbrook wherein she would "relinquish her rights" in the 6.32 
acres parcel of property by selling that property to Defendants for $21,185.47. (R. 136 at 
f^ 31). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Clay Holbrook refused to finalize the transaction, 
and thereby breached their oral agreement. (R. 136-138, 140-142). 
Plaintiff was given ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery. The first 
scheduling order was entered on June 13, 2008, providing that fact discovery should be 
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completed by October 31,2008 (R. 76-77). After Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the 
scheduling order, a second scheduling order was entered on August 11, 2008, providing 
that fact discovery would end on December 2, 2008. (R. 84-86, 92-93). A third 
scheduling order was entered on March 9, 2009, providing that fact discovery should be 
completed by July 10, 2009. (R. 157-158). During the course of discovery, Plaintiff 
served various discovery requests, to which Defendants responded and provided at least 
668 pages of documents pertaining to the underlying transactions. (R. 81-83, 97, 149, 
172, 174, 233). Plaintiff had ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery, she 
served several discovery requests, and in response to such discovery requests she 
received hundreds of pages of documentation pertaining to the real property transactions 
she put at issue in her Third Amended Complaint. 
After the close of fact discovery (pursuant to the deadline in the third amended 
scheduling order), Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (R. 235; see 
also Addendum 1 at p. 29). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, and an affidavit supporting her memorandum. (R. 377-503; see also 
Addendum 7 and 8 at pp. 105-130). She attached several documents to her affidavit, 
most of which had been produced by Defendants. (R. 401-503). However, neither her 
memorandum in opposition nor her affidavit made any attempt to controvert the 
statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Defendants' memorandum. (R. 377-400). A 
hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was held on September 21, 2009. 
(R. 547; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 131-168). During the hearing, Judge Thomas heard 
oral argument from both parties, and asked Plaintiff several questions regarding her 
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claims and contentions. (R. 547 at pages 13-28; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 135-150)1. 
As a result of the briefs and the hearing, the trial court granted Defendants' motion. The 
Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on October 8, 2009, 
granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff s claims. (R. 533-541; see 
also Addendum "A" to the Brief of Appellant). Plaintiff then filed this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Hampton") 
filed a lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the Seventh District Court on November 10, 1999, 
case number 994700340 (referred to hereafter as the "1999 Suit."). (R. 240, 258-276). 
2. In conjunction with the 1999 Suit, Plaintiff recorded several lis pendens 
against parcels of real property, as follows: 
a. Recorded on November 15, 1999, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, 
as Entry No. 77489, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property 
(R. 240, 280-282; see Addendum 2(a) at p. 41); 
b. Recorded on February 4, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 78686, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of 
access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241, 283-284; see Addendum 
2(b) at p. 44); 
c. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 79477, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of 
1
 Only the first page of the transcript of the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was marked as 
part of the record, number 547. Therefore, references to the transcript of the summary judgment hearing will refer 
to the number marked as the record, 547, followed by individual pages as identified in the transcript. 
access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241,285-286; see Addendum 
2(c) at p. 46); 
d. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as 
Entry No. 79478, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property (R. 
241, 287-289; see Addendum 2(d) at p. 48). 
3. Two of the lis pendens specifically state, "The Petitioner [Ms. Hampton] 
claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described lands, this being 
the object of the action." (R. 241, 286, 289; see Addendum 2 at pp. 47, 50). 
4. On January 23, 2002, the Seventh Judicial District Court, Judge Scott N. 
Johansen, entered a stipulated order in the 1999 Suit requiring Ms. Hampton to release 
her lis pendens as to two specific parcels so those parcels could be sold to third parties 
(R. 290-312; see Addendum 3): (1) the Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge, consisting of 
approximately 6.37 acres) (hereafter referred to as "House Parcel"); (2) a total of 675 
acres west of Helper, Utah (hereafter referred to as "Vacant Parcel."). (R. 241, 290-293; 
see Addendum 3 at pp. 58-61). 
5. The Stipulated Order of the 1999 Suit provided that the lis pendens was to 
remain in effect with respect to the remainder of the property. (R. 242, 294). 
6. The Stipulated Order also ordered that the two parcels be sold, and after the 
payment of certain expenses, the proceeds from the sale should be "deposited into an 
interest bearing trust account, set up by counsel for [Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen], 
with both signatures required for disbursements, which funds are to be distributed as the 
Court orders and as the parties might agree." (R. 242, 294 at Tf 8). 
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7. Defendant Professional Title Services was retained as the closing and 
escrow agent for the sales of the two parcels. (R. 242, 313-317). 
8. At the time Professional Title Services became involved, the Home Parcel 
was under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy for $200,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at 
114-7). 
9. The Vacant Parcel was also under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton 
Foy, for a price of $135,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at fflf 4-7). 
10. Defendants had no involvement in the negotiation of the two contracts, but 
was only involved to act as closing and escrow agent for the transaction. (R. 242, 314 at 
17). 
11. The two transactions took approximately two months from when 
Professional Title Services was retained until the transactions closed in January, 2002. 
During that time period, Defendant Clay Holbrook ("Holbrook"), the President of 
Professional Title Services, was in communication with Richard Golden, the attorney for 
Kim Jensen, and Douglas Stowell, the attorney for Tonda Hampton. (R. 242, 314 at f^ 9). 
12. Before the transactions closed, Holbrook was informed by both Richard 
Golden and Douglas Stowell that the parties had agreed to escrow the proceeds from the 
sales, and that the parties' agreement would be entered as an order of the Court. (R. 243, 
315 at If 10). 
13. The transactions both closed on January 25, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at If 10, 
318-321). 
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14. The settlement statement from the sale of the House Parcel shows that the 
proceeds from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were 
$42,060.94. (R. 243, 315 at If 12, 318). 
15. The settlement statement for the Vacant Parcel shows that the proceeds 
from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $40,466.15. (R. 
243,315at^|13,320). 
16. After the transactions closed and the funds were received by Professional 
Title Services, Holbrook caused the proceeds to be distributed as required by the Court. 
(R. 243, 315 at T| 14). 
17. The proceeds from the sale of the Vacant Parcel, in the amount of 
$40,466.15, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to 
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda 
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at ^ 15, 322). 
18. The proceeds from the sale of the House Parcel, in the amount of 
$42,060.94, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to 
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda 
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315-316 at ^ 16, 323). 
19. Professional Title Services was only retained to act as closing and escrow 
agent, and once the checks were issued to the two attorneys, neither Professional Title 
Services nor Clay Holbrook had further involvement. Neither Professional Title Services 
nor Clay Holbrook has any knowledge of what happened to the proceeds once the 
attorneys received them, or how the proceeds were distributed. (R. 244, 316 at f^ 17). 
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20. On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen 
and Double J. Triangle, LLC, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number 
020701072 ("2002 Suit"). (R. 244, 325-328, 363-364; see Addendum 5 at p. 90). 
21. In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against 
many of the same parcels at issue in the 1999 Suit and identified on the lis pendens 
recorded in the 1999 Suit ("2002 Lis Pendens"). (R. 244, 280-289, 329-331; see 
Addendum 2 at page 51). 
22. The 2002 Lis Pendens is signed by Plaintiff, and states, "During this case, a 
Lis Pendens need [sic] to be in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent 
[Kim Jensen] has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, 
Fraudulently." (R. 244, 331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53). 
23. On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number 030700004 ("2003 Suit"). (R. 244, 332-
336, 366-367; see Addendum 5 at p. 93). 
24. In conjunction with the 2003 suit, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens against many 
of the same properties identified in the lis pendens of the 1999 Suit ("2003 Lis Pendens"). 
(R. 245, 337-339; see Addendum 2 at p. 54). 
25. On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court, as case number 040700256 ("2004 Suit"). (R. 245, 340-
342; see Addendum 4 at p. 65). 
26. In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff named Kim Jensen and Richard Golden, a former 
attorney of Kim Jensen, as defendants. (R. 245, 340). 
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27. In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that an "Interest Bearing Trust Account" 
was established, referring to the Stipulated Order entered in the 1999 Suit on January 23, 
2002. (R. 245, 340). Plaintiff also alleged that the "trust account no longer exists." (R. 
245, 340). 
28. Also in the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of 
our other Carbon County Real estate," and "Defendants [sic] True Records will show that 
Petitioner [Tonda Hampton] has never given any oral or written document to allow any 
ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre[s, w]hich are at issue." (R. 245, 341; see 
Addendum 4 at p. 67). 
29. In response to Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 2004 Suit, Kim Jensen filed 
a motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support. (R. 245, 343-372; see Addendum 5). 
30. The motion to dismiss and memorandum in support filed by Kim Jensen in 
the 2004 Suit asserted the defense of res judicata and set forth the history of Plaintiff s 
various lawsuits filed against Kim Jensen. (R. 245, 345-347). The memorandum 
contains as exhibits various court pleadings that have since been destroyed by the 
Seventh Judicial District Court (R. 245-246): 
a. Exhibit I to the memorandum is the Order, Findings, and Conclusions for 
the 1999 Case, holding that Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen did not have a 
common law marriage, dismissing the 1999 Suit with prejudice, and 
ordering the lis pendens filed by Tonda Hampton against all real property to 
be released (R. 246, 352-361; see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89); 
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b. Exhibit II is the complaint in the 2002 Suit, containing allegations that the 
real property should be divided (R. 246, 362-364; see Addendum 5 at pp. 
90-92); 
c. Exhibit III is the complaint in the 2003 Suit, alleging that Kim Jensen had 
"sold and hidden" real property, and asking the Court to "reverse 
ownership" of the real property and other assets (R. 246, 365-367; see 
Addendum 5 at pp. 93-95); 
d. Exhibit IV is a ruling in the 2002 Suit and the 2003 Suit (which cases were 
apparently consolidated), dismissing the claims pertaining to the real 
property, and ordering the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff to be released. (R. 
246, 368-372; see Addendum 5 at pp. 96-99). 
31. In response to the motion to dismiss filed by Kim Jensen in the 2004 Suit, 
the Seventh Judicial District Court granted the motion and entered an order on September 
13, 2006, dismissing the 2004 Suit on the ground that the 2004 Suit was barred due to the 
doctrine of res judicata ("2004 Order"). (R. 246, 373-376; see Addendum 6). 
32. Plaintiff filed this action against these Defendants on August 14, 2007. (R. 
1, 246). Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008, bringing 
allegations regarding the real property that was litigated in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, 
the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit. (R. 131-148, 246-247) Plaintiffs requested relief asks 
for, "[a] declaratory judgment concerning real property titled in plaintiffs name and to 
the, Water Rights, Hunting rights and BLM leases to be shown as Discovery unfolds; [b] 
injunction for Defendants to correct all mistakes concerning all real estate interests, water 
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rights, hunting rights and not limited to BLM Leases. Plaintiff is willing to be 
compensated at fair Market value as of approximately 2007 or 2008 all Plaintiffs interest 
have been depleted from her ownership to be shown as discovery unfolds." (Id.) 
33. In approximately July of 2007, Plaintiff contacted Clay Holbrook with 
questions regarding the sales of the two parcels and the distribution of the proceeds. (R. 
247,316). 
34. In an effort to avoid litigation, Holbrook made a settlement offer to Plaintiff 
to resolve all claims and prepared a proposed settlement agreement. (R. 247, 316, 658). 
35. Ms. Hampton did not agree to the proposed settlement agreement as 
prepared by Mr. Holbrook, but instead stated that she would only accept the amount 
offered by Mr. Holbrook as payment for the House Parcel, and that she intended to 
pursue the remaining claims pertaining to the Vacant Parcel. (R. 247, 316). 
36. In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she entered into an 
agreement with Defendants whereby Defendants would purchase her interest in the 
House Parcel. (R. 136 at ^ 31). 
37. During the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiff stated that the intent of the 
alleged oral agreement was for Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel: 
THE COURT: Okay. What were the terms, do you believe? 
MS. HAMPTON: The terms were to—I would relinquish my 
rights, basically, it was all stated on a document he typed up, everything 
was legit on August 27th, so all those terms in that August 27th disclaimer, I 
believe would be correct, to my belief, and it's all listed in the disclaimer. 
Those are the terms where I would relinquish my rights to the error of title 
of 6.31 acres for the value of—consideration of 21,185.47. 
(R. 547 at page 22; see Addendum 9 at p. 144). 
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THE COURT: —there is a reasonable basis to find there is a 
disputed fact regarding the existence of an oral contract. And—and I'm 
looking to see what you believed the terms of the oral contract were and 
where that—where that document is—why you believe those terms are 
accurate, the basis for what you believe those terms are. 
MS. HAMPTON: The basis, he agreed to pay the money to 
relinquish my rights of my titled ownership that the company erred in. I 
don't believe I have the—a document to show that at this time. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, there's no document that shows what the 
terms of that agreement were; is that correct? 
MS. HAMPTON: Not at this time— 
(R. 547 at page 23; see Addendum 9 at p. 145). 
THE COURT: Yeah. In other words, the terms of a contract would 
be, you know, the—the things that go to the heart of the agreement. In other 
words, there would be a payment, you allege, of twenty-one thousand 
some-odd dollars in exchange for what? What—what-what were the terms 
of the—of the oral agreement from your perspective? 
MS. HAMPTON: He would pay me the $21,185.47 to relinquish my 
rights to a deed of 6.32 acres. That was a discussion and an agreement we 
came to. 
THE COURT: So, it was-it was totally to relinquish rights to a 
deed? That's all it was? 
MS. HAMPTON: To relinquish my rights to a deed, one deed of 
6.32 acres. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, essentially, your oral agreement was the 
payment would be made to relinquish the rights in land. Is that what you're-
MS. HAMPTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: - is that what you're telling me? 
MS. HAMPTON: It was land, real property. 
THE COURT: So, ma'am, is it your assertion that it was not in the 
nature of a settlement agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. 
THE COURT: It was not in the nature of a settlement agreement? 
MS. HAMPTON: No. The-
THE COURT: But rather was for payment for an interest in land. Is 
that what you're asserting? I want to make sure I understand this, ma'am. 
MS. HAMPTON: Correct. 
(R. 547 at pages 24-25; see Addendum 9 at pp. 146-147). 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Although Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment raised several legal 
theories, there is only one issue relevant to this appeal: whether the trial court properly 
granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants assert that the trial court 
properly granted the motion. 
First, the undisputed facts as presented by Defendants were not controverted by 
Plaintiff. The affidavit and documents presented by Plaintiff in her memorandum in 
opposition did not have any information sufficient to raise issues of fact. In her appellate 
brief, Plaintiff makes various arguments that the trial court did not allow her to present 
evidence. However, this matter was decided on summary judgment so Plaintiff had every 
opportunity to present evidence in her briefings and at the hearing on Defendants' 
motion. Plaintiff conducted significant discovery, but the documents and information 
presented in her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment failed to create 
issues of fact. Accordingly, the facts presented by Defendants were undisputed by 
Plaintiff. 
Second, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff has filed several 
lawsuits pertaining to her ownership interest in the real properties at issue in this matter. 
Plaintiff brought the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit against 
Kim Jensen alleging that Plaintiff owned interests in real property, and that Kim Jensen 
had "fraudulently" removed Plaintiffs name from the title to the properties. In those 
lawsuits, Plaintiff filed lis pendens against the same real property that is at issue in this 
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matter. The undisputed facts demonstrate that all of those cases were resolved against 
Plaintiff, with the trial courts ordering Plaintiff to release the lis pendens, and ruling that 
Plaintiff had no interest in those properties. Plaintiff brought this matter naming 
Defendants as parties rather than Kim Jensen, but her allegations are the same as the 
other lawsuits. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata. 
Third, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff did not file her 
complaint against Defendants until August 14, 2007. However, Plaintiff was aware of 
the facts and circumstances pertaining to her allegations beginning as early as the 1999 
Suit. Defendants acted as closing agent for the transaction that took place in January, 
2002. After the transaction closed, Defendants wrote a check to the attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Kim Jensen for the amount of the final proceeds resulting from the transaction. After 
that point, Defendants had no further involvement. Plaintiff then brought lawsuits in 
2002, 2003, and 2004, raising the same allegations that have been brought in this matter. 
Therefore, it is apparent that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
underlying her allegations, and the statute of limitations on her claims ran well before 
August, 2007, when she filed her action against Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs claims of an oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds. 
In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the alleged oral agreement was 
intended to "relinquish [her] rights" in the House Parcel. At the hearing on Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff clarified that the oral agreement was for 
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Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel, yet she also admitted that there 
was no written agreement, and she presented no signed, written agreement together with 
her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, because 
Plaintiff has asserted an oral agreement for the purchase of an interest in real property, 
her claims based upon the alleged oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds. 
VI. ARGUMENT - THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as 
Plaintiff did not dispute Defendants' statements of fact, and the undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts of 
the case and the law are clear that Plaintiffs' claims are barred due to res judicata, the 
statute of limitations, and the statute of frauds. 
A. Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of 
facts 
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. "When the moving party has 
presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party 
fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine 
issue of fact is present or would be at trial." Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health 
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 40, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
17 
768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Finally, "An affidavit that merely reflects the 
affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of 
fact." Id. at H 50 (quoting Dairy Prod Servs. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81 at ^ 54, 13 
P.3d581). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that in opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, "[f]or each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party 
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to 
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Rule 7(c)(3)(B) U.R.C.P.. 
Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
failed to controvert any of Defendants' statements of fact. (R. 377-400; see Addendum 7 
and 8 at pp. 105-130). In opposing Defendants' motion, Plaintiff did not respond to any 
of Defendants' facts, but instead, she only discussed unsubstantiated allegations. 
Although Plaintiff identifies documents that supposedly support her allegations, there is 
no indication in any of the documents provided by Plaintiff that she disputed any facts 
raised by Defendants. The issues presented by Defendants pertained to res judicata and 
the statutes of limitations. The facts (or allegations) raised by Plaintiff were not relevant 
to the issues raised by Defendants, and would have no bearing on the decision by the 
Court. Therefore, Defendants' statement of facts were undisputed by Plaintiff. 
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff summarily asserts that "the evidence does not 
support the court's ruling that [of] res judicata," and the "court improperly prevented 
Plaintiffs evidence of fraud issues." See Brief of Appellant at page 12, items LA. and 
I.D. In another part of her brief, Plaintiff states, "Had the court simply allowed Plaintiff 
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to introduce her evidence to this case [sic] would have clearly been in Plaintiffs [sic] 
favor and exposed Defendants' misleading intent." See Brief of Appellant at page 10. 
However, Plaintiff makes those statements without providing any supporting arguments 
or citations to the record. She does not indicate what evidence she was prevented from 
introducing, or even what evidence supports her allegations of fraud. 
The proceeding below was a motion for summary judgment. The record 
demonstrates that Plaintiff conducted significant discovery and Defendants produced 
hundreds of pages of documents in response to Plaintiffs discovery. Defendants brought 
a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff had every opportunity to present her 
evidence in her briefings in opposition to Defendants' motion and at the hearing. 
Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts as presented in their motion for 
summary judgment, so it was appropriate for the trial court to make a ruling as a matter 
of law as to the issues presented by Defendants. 
B. The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment as to the issue of res judicata 
Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411, \ 14, 82 P.3d 
198. "[C]laim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim 
that has been fully litigated previously," and involves three elements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Id. at 115 (quoting Snyder v. Murray C/(y Cor/7., 2003 UT 13, 1j 34, 73 P.3d 325). 
Defendants recognize that they were not parties to the previous suits filed by Tonda 
Hampton, so claim preclusion would not be applicable. However, the doctrine of issue 
preclusion does bar Plaintiffs claims. 
Issue preclusion "arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in 
the first suit." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, % 35, 73 P.3d 325 (quoting 
Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^ f 19, 16 P.3d 1214). Issue 
preclusion requires four elements: 
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a 
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in 
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Id. (quoting Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, lj 12, 52 P.3d 1267). 
Plaintiff filed four separate and distinct lawsuits for the purpose of adjudicating title to 
the properties at question in this suit: the 1999 Suit {see supra Section IV. Statement of 
the Facts (hereafter "Facts" or "Fact") 1-5, 30(a)), the 2002 Suit {see Facts 20-22, 30(b, 
d); see Addendum 5 at p. 90), the 2003 Suit {see Facts 23-24, 30(c-d); see Addendum 5 at 
p. 93), and the 2004 Suit {see Facts 25-31; see Addendum 5 at p. 65). Therefore, the first 
element is met, as Plaintiff was the same party in the prior suits. 
In each of the aforementioned suits, Plaintiff brought claims asserting her interest 
in the real properties at issue in this case. See id. Specifically, Plaintiff filed lis pendens 
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in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, and the 2003 Suit. See id.; see also Addendum 2. The 
issues in this case are identical to the issues in the prior cases: Plaintiff is asserting that 
she has a right in or title to various parcels of real property. Although in the prior cases 
she was asserting the claim against a different party, it is evident that she lost those cases, 
and so is trying to find a new party against whom to bring her grievances. However, the 
issues are identical, so the second element of issue preclusion is met. 
The previous suits were completely, fairly, and fully litigated. The dockets and 
the pleadings of the prior cases demonstrate that Plaintiff was represented by various 
attorneys, filed several motions, and had every opportunity to present her case to the 
Court. See generally Facts 1-6, 20-31. 
Finally, the previous suits resulted in final judgments on the merits. The first was 
the Stipulated Order from the 1999 Suit entered on January 23, 2002. See Fact 4; see 
Addendum 3. In the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed, and the Court ordered, that the 
properties would be sold and the proceeds would be put in escrow. See Facts 4-6. 
Defendant Professional Title Services was retained to conduct the closing, and on 
January 29, 2002, Defendant transmitted the proceeds to the attorneys for Kim Jensen 
and Tonda Hampton. See Facts 7-19. Accordingly, Defendants complied with their 
obligations, and the proceeds were distributed directly to Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiffs 
remaining claims to the other parcels of property were dismissed by a final order of the 
Court, wherein the Court found that Plaintiff and Kim Jensen did not have a common law 
marriage, and therefore ordered the lis pendens filed in the 1999 Suit to be released. See 
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Fact No. 30(a); see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims in the 1999 
Suit were fully adjudicated. 
The claims in the other suits were also fully adjudicated. The 2002 Suit and the 
2003 Suit ended with a final order of the Court dismissing Plaintiffs property claims and 
ordering the lis pendens to be released. See Fact 30(d); see Addendum 5 at p. 96. The 
2004 Suit also resulted in a final order on the merits, once again dismissing Plaintiffs 
claims wherein she asserted an interest in the property through a partnership agreement. 
See Fact 31; see Addendum 6 at p. 100. Accordingly, the fourth element of issue 
preclusion is met, as Plaintiffs claims in the prior suits all resulted in final judgments on 
the merits. 
Plaintiff has already attempted, multiple times, to claim an interest in the real 
properties that are the subject of this suit. Each time, a judgment was entered against 
Plaintiff, or Plaintiffs claims were dismissed on the merits. Plaintiffs suits against Kim 
Jensen have failed, and she has sued these Defendants to attempt to find a party to pay 
her for property that the Seventh District Court has already declared never belonged to 
her. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims have already been fully litigated in previous suits, 
and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the 
ground that Plaintiffs claims are barred due to the doctrine of res judicata. 
C. The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment as to the issue of the statute of limitations 
Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint brings causes of action for declaratory 
judgment, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, slander 
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of title, negligence, and fraud. The statute of limitations for fraud claims is three years 
from the discovery of the fraud. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3). The statute of 
limitation is four years for all other claims raised by Plaintiff. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-307 ("An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law."). 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff filed suit against Kim Jensen on 
November 10, 1999, and recorded a lis pendens against the parcels of real property at 
issue in this matter as early as November 15, 1999. See Facts 1-3. The properties at 
issue were sold on January 25, 2002 (with Defendants acting as the closing agent for that 
transaction), and Defendants distributed the proceeds of the sale to counsel for Plaintiff 
on January 29, 2002. See Facts 6-18. Accordingly, Plaintiff or her counsel were 
involved in litigation asserting an interest in title to the parcels of real property, and when 
they were sold, the proceeds were distributed to Plaintiffs attorney on January 29, 2002. 
Therefore, any cause of action regarding title to the real properties, and Defendants' 
involvement in the sale of those properties, began to run at the latest on January 29, 2002. 
Because the statute of limitations on all actions other than fraud is 4 years, (and the 
statute of limitations for fraud is only 3 years), the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs 
claims expired in January, 2006. Plaintiff did not file her initial complaint in this matter 
until August, 2007. See Fact 32. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed her complaint after the 
statute of limitations had run, and Plaintiffs claims are barred. 
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff has argued that the "fraudulent concealment" 
doctrine prevented the running and expiration of the statutes of limitations. See Brief of 
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Appellant at 11-13. As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run "upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Colosimo v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, f 14, 156 P.3d 806 (quoting Russell PackardDev., 
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^  20, 108 P.3d 741). An exception to that general rule is the 
discovery rule, which operates to toll a statute of limitation "until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action." Id. at ^ 15 (quoting Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ f 21, 
108 P.3d 741). The discovery rule only applies if "provided for by statute (the 'statutory 
discovery rule')" or "when required by equity (the 'equitable discovery rule')." Id. The 
equitable discovery rule may be applied "when either exceptional circumstances or the 
defendant's fraudulent concealment prevents the plaintiff from timely filing suit." Id. 
In the Colosimo case, the Supreme Court clarified the knowledge requirement in 
the context of the discovery rule: 
A plaintiff is deemed to have discovered his action when he has 
actual knowledge of the fraud "or by reasonable diligence and inquiry 
should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him." We 
have particularly emphasized the importance of the diligence requirement, 
stating that "[a] party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting 
the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want of 
knowledge" and that "[a] party is required to make inquiry if his findings 
would prompt further investigation." In other words, if a party has 
knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably 
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will 
run. 
Id. at If 17 (quoting Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993)). In this case, it 
is not necessary to discuss whether the statutory discovery rule or the equitable discovery 
rule apply, because the allegations and pleadings filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the 
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2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff had 
knowledge of the facts underlying the alleged fraud when she filed those suits. 
In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff executed and caused to be recorded a 
lis pendens on December 19, 2002. See Fact 21 (R. 329-331; see Addendum 2 at p. 51). 
On the 2002 lis pendens, Plaintiff states, "During this case, a Lis Pendens need [sic] to be 
in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent [Kim Jensen] has been 
depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, Fraudulently." Fact 22 (R. 
331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53). Therefore, as early as December 19, 2002, Plaintiff 
asserted that properties were being fraudulently transferred out of her name. Those are 
the same allegations, and pertain to the same parcels of property, that are at issue in this 
matter. The facts also demonstrate that Plaintiff raised those same issues in the 2003 Suit 
and the 2004 Suit. See Facts 23-31. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts 
underlying the alleged fraud as early as December 19, 2002, and the statute of limitations 
on all claims began to run at that time by at least that time (if not before), expiring well 
before August, 2007, when Plaintiff brought her complaint against Defendants. 
Therefore, because Plaintiff did not file her complaint against Defendants until August, 
2007, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of 
the statute of limitations. 
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D. The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment as to the issue of the alleged oral 
agreement 
In her Third Amended Complaint, and at the hearing on Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that the terms of the alleged oral agreement 
provided that Defendants would pay a sum of money to Plaintiff, in exchange for which 
Plaintiff would convey her interest in the House Parcel to Defendants. See Facts 33-37. 
An oral agreement for an interest in land is barred by the statute of frauds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing. 
Plaintiffs alleged oral agreement clearly falls within the statute of frauds. 
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel. An 
agreement of that nature is clearly an agreement for the purchase of an "interest in real 
property." Accordingly, because there is no writing, the agreement is barred pursuant to 
the statute of frauds, and the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of Plaintiff s oral agreement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Defendants assert that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants for the following reasons: 
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(A) Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts; the documents and 
arguments presented by Plaintiff in her opposition did not create a material issue of fact, 
pertaining to res judicata, the statute of limitations, or the statute of frauds; because the 
proceeding before the trial court was a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff had every 
opportunity to present evidence in opposition to Defendants' motion, therefore her 
arguments that the trial judge "prevented testimony" is not correct; 
(B) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiff 
brought several suits (in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004), asserting that she had wrongfully 
lost her interests in real property, and all those cases were decided on the merits against 
Plaintiff, so her claims are barred pursuant to res judicata; 
(C) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitations; the previous suits 
filed by Plaintiff demonstrate that she had knowledge of the facts underlying her 
allegations in this action as early as December, 2002, so the statute of limitations ran by 
at least December, 2006, long before Plaintiffs complaint was filed in August, 2007; 
(D) Plaintiffs allegation of an oral agreement is barred by the statute of frauds; 
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants had agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel, 
and such a verbal agreement for the purchase of an interest in land is clearly barred by the 
statute of frauds. 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that this Court affirm the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
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Dated this & day of April, 2010 
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